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Abstract
In this article, we investigate the determinants of individuals’ opinions concerning the economic impact of immigrants.
Unlike most previous studies, we use a large sample of 61 countries (Joint WVS/EVS 2017–2020 dataset) that are either
net receivers or net emitters of migrants. Using a multilevel model, we test the effect of individuals’ characteristics and
of several macroeconomic variables on the assessment of immigrants’ impact on development. We highlight that natives’
evaluation of the economic consequences of immigration is more influenced by age, trust, education, and income than
by contextual variables such as growth, inflation, inequalities, income level, or number of immigrants in the country. Our
results match with the hypothesis that immigrants are considered substitutes for low‐ and medium‐skilled workers in
capital‐abundant countries. However, neither labour‐market nor welfare‐state considerations can be considered as the
main drivers of the appraisals made about the economic impact of immigration. Our results tend to confirm the prediction
that greater contact with immigrants reduces anti‐immigrant opinions, in particular for skilled people. In contrast, immi‐
grant inflows lead low‐ and medium‐skilled people to make worse judgments concerning the economic consequences of
immigration. All in all, our results validate the view that education comprises a major part of the cognitive assessment of
the role played by immigrants in the economy, at least in high‐income countries.
Keywords
attitudes towards immigration; economic impacts; immigrants; labour‐market
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Migration and Refugee Flows: New Insights” edited by Inmaculada Martínez‐Zarzoso
(University of Göttingen, Germany / Jaume I University, Spain).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
In the last few decades, politicians’ standpoints on immi‐
gration policies have played a central role in election
debates. In practice, immigration policy has proven to be
influenced more by interest groups (Facchini & Mayda,
2008, 2010) than by public opinion towards immigra‐
tion (Arregui & Creighton, 2018; Sides & Citrin, 2007).
However, the position taken by candidates regarding
immigration policy during campaigns is capable of influ‐
encing votes significantly (Hatton, 2021). Since attitudes
partly reflect objective threats but also perceived threats
(Kusow & DeLisi, 2020), there is no need to say that the
narratives of far‐right parties may increase negative atti‐
tudes towards some specific groups and, in particular,
immigrants, undermining social trust andmaking the suc‐
cess of integration policies and the potential for social
cohesion more unlikely. The topic is also timely because
the functioning of democracy is changing considerably
due to the abundant sources of information that substan‐
tially modify how individuals perceive reality and build
their knowledge (Dahlgren, 2018). Even though immigra‐
tion has been proven to have only small or negligible
effects on the wages of native‐born workers (Ottaviano
& Peri, 2012), and to have a minimal or negligible impact
on public finances (Dustmann et al., 2010; Nyman &
Ahlskog, 2018), the perceived threat of competition for
material resources may well influence native workers’
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opinions. Therefore, the success of immigration policies
may well depend on our understanding of the elements
shaping these individuals’ attitudes.
The literature on attitudes towards immigration has
focused on different theories. On the one hand, the
group‐threat theory posits that exposure to a higher pro‐
portion of ethnic outgroups (including immigrant pop‐
ulations) may lead individuals to increasingly perceive
individuals from out‐groups as a threat (Blalock, 1967).
Furthermore, prejudice as a sense of group position
would be primarily derived from feelings, and is there‐
fore subjective in nature (Blumer, 1958). On the other
hand, intergroup theory argues that interaction with
immigrants could improve intergroup attitudes under
“optimal conditions” (Allport, 1954). In contrast, the
political economy approach explains attitudes toward
immigration about individual personal economic inter‐
est. However, these attitudes may be connected to the
perception of the economic, social, and cultural impact
of immigration on the nation as a whole more than on
the expected effect on the individual (Hainmueller &
Hopkins, 2014).
The purpose of this study is to outline how the con‐
text of countries interplays with individuals’ character‐
istics to explain whether they perceive immigrants as
beneficial for the development of their country. To this
end, we focus on a large and heterogeneous sample of
61 countries from the JointWVS/EVS 2017–2021 dataset,
unlike most studies, which focus only on developed
countries (with the recent exception of Cooray et al.,
2018, who investigates the “taste for discrimination” in
53 countries). Thanks to a multilevel approach, we inves‐
tigate the effect of both individual‐ and country‐level
variables on individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants.
We focus on the relationship between these beliefs and
macroeconomic contexts such as wealth, size of the
migrant population (stock), the recent entry or exit of
migrants (flows), and inequality level, a question mainly
overlooked by the literature. To bring new elements into
the understanding of cognitive mechanisms that trans‐
late macro‐level appraisal into individual perceptions,
we investigate whether education and personal income
influence these attitudes in a different manner, depend‐
ing on macro‐economic contexts.
Among our most important results, we find that peo‐
ple’s appreciation of the consequences of immigration
for economic development is more closely related to
age, trust, education, and income than to other socio‐
economic characteristics. Our results tend to confirm
the view that labour‐market considerations cannot be
considered the main drivers of the assessment of immi‐
grants’ economic impact, and neither do we find clear
evidence that the impact on the welfare state influ‐
ences these views. Contextual variables have no influ‐
ence per se, but we do detect salient differences in
sensitivity to the country’s context between individuals
with different levels of education. Overall, highly edu‐
cated people are more conscious of the economic ben‐
efits brought by immigration, especially in high‐income
countries. Our results do not match with the in‐group/
out‐group theory that predicts that the higher the size of
the out‐group, the higher the feeling of threats by indi‐
viduals of the in‐group. In contrast, our results generally
confirm the prediction of the intergroup contact theory,
in particular for skilled people.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2,
we review the theory and evidence on attitudes toward
immigration. In Section 3, we present an overview of the
data used in this study and the hypotheseswe aim to test.
The empirical results are presented in Section 4,whilewe
draw conclusions and discuss possible policy implications
in Section 5.
2. Theoretical and Empirical Evidence Concerning
Support for Immigration
Much of the research has approached the question
of attitudes towards immigrants through the group‐
threat versus intergroup‐contact theoretical frameworks.
The group‐threat hypothesis is based on Blumer’s (1958)
theory of prejudice and leads to the conjecture that neg‐
ative views about immigration are based on the threats
perceived by natives. These threats are derived from the
real or imagined differences between themselves and
immigrants. This idea relates to the power‐threat hypoth‐
esis of Blalock (1967), which posits that the larger the
size of an out‐group, the stronger the sense of threat
experienced by the in‐group. In contrast, according to
intergroup‐contact theory, increasing proximity to immi‐
grants in one’s environment under “optimal conditions”
(Allport, 1954) can improve intergroup attitudes, via
greater opportunities for interaction with immigrants.
In short, contact between races or between natives and
migrants could either foster mutual understanding, or
breed conflict or negative views.
Researchers have found mixed results supporting
both theories (for a meta‐analysis of the intergroup con‐
tact theory see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; for a full discus‐
sion see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, or Fussell, 2014).
While Hatton (2016) and Gorodzeisky and Semyonov
(2018) report that high immigration levels favour nega‐
tive attitudes towards immigrants, other studies support
the intergroup contact theory (Baláž et al., 2021; Cooray
et al., 2018; Economidou et al., 2020) or find no evidence
of stronger anti‐immigrant opinions in high‐immigration
areas (Citrin et al., 1997; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Hood &
Morris, 1997; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Sides & Citrin,
2007). Consistent with the intergroup contact hypothe‐
sis, Fussell (2014) emphasizes that racial diversity favours
amore positive attitude if the education level of the area
(county) is high, but that it would lead to the opposite
outcome in low‐education counties, consistent with the
group‐threat hypothesis. Citrin and Sides (2008) show
that attitudes toward immigration are surprisingly unre‐
lated to the number and composition of the foreign‐born
population, even when natives tend to overestimate the
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number of immigrants in their countries or have a dis‐
torted perception of the racial and ethnic composition
(Alba et al., 2005). As a matter of fact, the literature has
stressed the role of media, information, and narratives
in shaping preference regarding immigration (Alesina
et al., 2019; De Poli et al., 2017; Facchini et al., 2017;
Grigorieff et al., 2018; Haaland & Roth, 2020; Héricourt
& Spielvogel, 2014). However, Hopkins et al. (2019) find
that providing accurate information about the size of
minority populations does not significantly alter atti‐
tudes towards immigration. Change in the foreign‐born
population might be more relevant for attitudes to immi‐
gration than group size per se (see Kaufmann, 2017;
Kaufmann & Goodwin, 2018, for a recent meta‐analysis;
and Laurence & Kim, 2021). This is in line with recent
studies that state that recent changes in the environ‐
ment, such as economic downturns (Davis&Deole, 2020;
Heizmann & Huth, 2021) or migration crises (Baláž et al.,
2021), exert a salient influence on group positioning and
perceived prejudice.
Hostility towards “others” is related to the perceived
interests and identity of the group that individuals con‐
sider they belong to. However, the features that iden‐
tify a social group are eclectic and vary between indi‐
viduals. Accordingly, attitudes towards immigrants are
found to be related to education, income, social class,
and gender, and some studies also identify other deter‐
minants such as cultural values, life experiences, world‐
views, racial concerns, ideology, and social trust (Citrin
& Sides, 2008; Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Economidou
et al., 2020; Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Ferrera &
Pellegata, 2018; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017; Sides & Citrin,
2007; Tabellini, 2020; Thomsen & Rafiqi, 2020; Valentino
et al., 2017). However, each characteristic may exert dif‐
ferent influences on individuals’ attitudes, depending on
where individuals live and on their cognitive and emo‐
tional assessment of the contexts. Hence, this literature
does not always lead to clear and testable proposals
(Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).
Education has a robust positive effect on reported
attitude toward immigrants in all studies, but the under‐
lying reason for this is not straightforward. Educated
people may have a more realistic view of the economic
benefits of immigration, because they interpret informa‐
tion frommedia with caution or select informationmore
rationally. Education is also related to how and whether
individuals consider immigrants as competition in the
labour market. Indeed, the political economy approach,
which explains attitudes to immigration in reference to
personal economic interest, produces clear predictions
derived from the effect of migrants on the labour mar‐
ket or on the welfare state.
As long as wages are mainly determined by skills,
native workers might fear a drop in wages where
new immigrants have similar skills, in line with the
Heckscher‐Ohlin model of international trade and the
factor‐proportions analysis model. Indeed, the labour‐
market hypothesis has been successfully verified by sev‐
eral empirical studies (Facchini & Mayda, 2009, 2012;
Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Scheve &
Slaughter, 2001). In addition, natives may fear that immi‐
grants “take their jobs.” Nonetheless, this hypothesis is
not fully backed by evidence, since the effect of being
unemployed on attitudes towards immigration is not
robust (Cooray et al., 2018; Economidou et al., 2020;
Hatton, 2016; Mayda, 2006). Moreover, higher‐skilled
immigrants are preferred to their lower‐skilled counter‐
parts, regardless of the native socio‐economic status of
respondents (Facchini & Mayda, 2012; Valentino et al.,
2017), showing that labour market considerations are
only part of the story. Moreover, most studies find the
old to be more anti‐immigrant than the young, which
could reflect the belief that immigrants would lower pen‐
sion benefits or, alternatively, that old people are more
concerned about preserving social values (O’Rourke &
Sinnott, 2006). Nonetheless, several studies lend sup‐
port to the welfare hypothesis (Dustmann & Preston,
2007; Facchini & Mayda, 2009, 2012; Hatton, 2016).
Finally, d’Hombres and Nunziata (2016) demonstrate
that higher levels of education lead to a more positive
reported attitude toward immigrants, both because they
are less exposed to the negative effects of migration, and
because they display more positive attitudes towards
diversity and integration.
Our study is related to the aforementioned lit‐
erature. However, our sample covers countries from
almost all continents, with different economic structures,
wealth levels, social structures, and institutional con‐
texts. We revisit the main hypothesis of the literature in
this broader context and examine the role played by edu‐
cation and income in individuals’ assessment of the eco‐
nomic role of immigrants. Thanks to the heterogeneity
of our sample and the wide range of characteristics con‐
sidered, we aim to confirm these hypotheses in a more
universal context and with a systematic approach.
3. Empirical Strategy
3.1. Econometric Model and Data
We seek to explain differences in beliefs between coun‐
tries and individuals regarding the economic impact of
immigration. To this end, we use the Joint WVS/EVS
2017–2021 dataset, which provides information about
socio‐demographics characteristics, income, education
level, societal attitudes, and tolerance towards immi‐
grants (among other values) for 61 countries. Our depen‐
dent variable IMM_IMPACT is based on the following
question: “Now we would like to know your opinion
about the people from other countries who come to
live in your country—the immigrants. How would you
evaluate the impact of these people on the develop‐
ment of your country?” Answers range from 1 (very
bad) to value 5 (very good). An alternative to this ques‐
tion focuses on people’s opposition to having immi‐
grants as neighbours or their “taste for discrimination”
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(with the questions, respectively, “On this list there are
various groups of people. Could you please mention
any that you would not like to have as neighbours?
Immigrants/foreignworkers,” and “When jobs are scarce,
should employers give priority to people of this coun‐
try over immigrants?”). Since the first question explicitly
refers to the impact on the development of the country,
this question seems less biased towards cultural or secu‐
rity concerns about migrants. As the impact on devel‐
opment is more related to an assessment of economic
mechanisms, we expect IMM_IMPACT to have a more
robust relationship with macroeconomic factors. Card
et al. (2012) show that compositional concerns (concerns
about whether it is better to have common traditions,
religion, language, or if immigration enriches cultural life
or increases social tensions) explainmore of the variation
in individual attitudes toward immigration policy, while
being less relevant in explaining opinions concerning the
impact of immigration on the economy. Nonetheless,
the answers to the three questions are highly correlated:
Our dependent variable IMM_IMPACT is associated with
the rejection of immigrants as neighbours (Pearson chi‐
squared = 2038.51, p‐value = 0.000) and with the rejec‐
tion of people of a different race as neighbours (Pearson
chi‐squared = 3789.86, p‐value = 0.000).
Since IMM_IMPACT is an ordered categorical vari‐
able, the natural way to estimate it is using ordi‐
nal models. However, as discussed in van Praag and
Ferrer‐i‐Carbonell (2008), when a dependent variable
relates to subjective scores, the use of linear models
instead of ordinal models does not affect the basic
results. In addition, the interpretation of interaction
terms is easier.
The hierarchical nature of our data, individuals (i, first
level) clustered into countries (c, second level) leads us to
choosemultilevelmodels as themost appropriate econo‐
metric method. Let IMM_IMPACTic denote how individ‐
ual i evaluates the impact of immigrants on the devel‐
opment on their country c. Null model specification of a
multilevel model allows testing whether there are coun‐
try differences in the evaluation of the impact of immi‐
grants. The null model specification is:
IMM_IMPACTic = 𝛽0 + u0c + eic
where u0c represents the random intercept and eic the
individual level residuals. It is assumed that both resid‐
uals are independent and follow normal distribution.
The Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) of the null spec‐




where 𝜎2u is the between‐country variance and 𝜎
2
e is the
within‐country between‐individual variance. The VPC
measures the proportion of the total variance due to dif‐
ferences between countries. Initially the VPC of our sam‐
ple is around 15.25%, so the use of multilevel specifica‐
tion is justified (in addition, the likelihood test also con‐
firms that differences by country are significantly differ‐
ent from zero).
The main model to explore is:
IMM_IMPACTic = (𝛽0 + u0c) + 𝛼1 Xic + 𝛼2 Zc + eic
where the vector Xic contains the individual characteris‐
tics and the vector Zc includes the contextual variables.
A full description of the individuals’ variables
and their descriptive statistics are reported in the
Supplementary Material. Several country‐specific char‐
acteristics are considered. As a proxy of capital labour
ratios, we include GDP per capita (in logarithms).We also
control for macroeconomic contexts by including GDP
growth rate, unemployment rate, and inflation. All these
variables are obtained from the World Development
Indicators for the year 2017. As a proxy for the social
cohesion of the countries, we use theGini index obtained
from SWIID for the year 2017. We also consider the
presence of immigrants by including the international
migrant stock as a percentage of the total population for
2019 (UN, 2019a) and the net migration rate per 1,000
population averaged on the period 2015–2020 (UN,
2019b). Summary statistics for the contextual variables
by countries (Table SM1) and correlation (Table SM2) are
provided in the Supplementary Material.
To explore the idea that education level and house‐
hold income may affect the view on immigrants dif‐
ferently depending on the context of the country, we
include several interaction terms in the previous model,
generating different models of this type:
IMM_IMPACTic = (𝛽0 + u0c) + 𝛼1 Xic + 𝛼2 Zc + 𝛼3 Iic + eic
where Iic represents successively the interaction terms
between educational level and GDP per capita, migrant
stock, net immigration rate, and Gini index, respec‐
tively; or the interactions between household income
and these four contextual variables, respectively.
As a robustness check, we have estimated multi‐
level logistic regressions using the positive opinion about
the impact of immigrants (a dichotomous variable) as a
dependent variable. The results obtained are similar to
those presented below and are available upon request.
3.2. Hypotheses
We test the labour‐market hypothesis. Following the
prediction derived from the Heckscher‐Ohlin model,
skilled people would rate higher IMM_IMPACT in
capital‐abundant countries while unskilled people would
rate higher IMM_IMPACT in labour‐abundant countries.
We hence expect a positive coefficient for the interac‐
tion between Education level and GDP per capita. This
effect should be observed among working people while
a non‐significant effect should be obtained for people
outside the workforce. Another perception based on
labour‐market considerations is that immigrants are tak‐
ing natives’ jobs, which should be confirmed by a nega‐
tive coefficient of being unemployed.
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Welfare state concerns are more difficult to isolate.
A positive coefficient for retired people would point out
a positive assessment of immigration on pensions fund‐
ing or on access to cheap personal services, while a nega‐
tive coefficient would reflect the belief that immigration
may lower pension benefits. Finally, a non‐significant
coefficient would express that, on average, assessment
of immigration is not related to pension‐funding con‐
cerns. The welfare state is also based on redistribution
from richest to poorest. As long as more equal coun‐
tries perform higher redistribution, which translates into
high income‐tax rates, we expect a positive and signifi‐
cant sign for the interaction betweenGINI andhousehold
income. As long as income is driven by skills, a similar
effect may be observed for the interaction between GINI
and education level. Additionally, a negative effect of net
immigration rate and migrant stocks would indicate that
immigrants are considered a threat for public finance or
a threat to social cohesion.
Based on the intergroup contact theory, greater con‐
tact with immigrants reduces threat perceptions and
prejudice against immigrants. This hypothesis would be
confirmed by a positive coefficient for stock of migrants.
Conversely, a negative sign would give support to the
hypothesis that the larger the “out‐group” population,
the larger the competition for scarce resources. For simi‐
lar reasons, the signs of net immigration rate would have
the same interpretation.
3.3. Overview of the Data
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our dependent
variable by country. We have data for 61 countries
(77,433 observations). The average immigrant impact is
2.94 for thewhole set of countries.Most of the countries
consider immigration as having neither a good nor a bad
impact on the economy. The respondents who consider
that immigrants have a good or very good impact on the
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of opinions on the economic impact of immigration (IMM_IMPACT) by country.
Country Sample size Mean Standard deviation % quite good and very good
Iceland (IS) 1366 3.84 0.86 66.76
Nigeria (NG) 1173 3.83 1.14 69.99
New Zealand (NZ) 601 3.79 0.92 63.23
Albania (AL) 1182 3.77 1.00 64.30
Philippines (PH) 1196 3.56 0.88 61.12
Armenia (AM) 1218 3.48 0.94 48.36
Norway (NO) 1007 3.48 0.83 51.44
Vietnam (VN) 1200 3.37 0.71 39.25
Spain (ES) 817 3.37 0.85 46.39
Switzerland (CH) 2686 3.35 0.89 42.33
Peru (PE) 1310 3.31 0.81 39.24
Finland (FI) 1001 3.23 0.89 39.36
Montenegro (ME) 706 3.22 0.92 30.17
Azerbaijan (AZ) 1280 3.21 0.94 37.34
Bangladesh (BD) 1140 3.17 0.94 36.05
Indonesia (ID) 3073 3.15 1.06 38.14
Sweden (SE) 1017 3.13 1.08 41.99
Kazakhstan (KZ) 915 3.12 0.82 25.14
Slovenia (SI) 816 3.12 0.77 25.25
South Korea (KR) 1245 3.05 0.73 27.23
Brazil (BR) 1260 3.05 0.90 29.68
Denmark (DK) 1572 3.05 0.86 28.50
Belarus (BY) 1039 3.04 0.77 20.40
Bolivia (BO) 1855 3.04 0.94 25.23
Poland (PL) 845 3.02 0.93 28.64
Mexico (MX) 1541 3.00 0.89 27.51
France (FR) 1481 3.00 0.99 27.89
Georgia (GE) 1806 2.99 0.98 23.81
Germany (DE) 2693 2.99 0.94 29.86
Kyrgyzstan (KG) 1029 2.95 1.07 24.10
Japan (JP) 585 2.95 0.97 31.45
Ukraine (UA) 812 2.93 0.68 13.67
North Macedonia (MK) 657 2.92 0.94 22.83
Chile (CL) 742 2.92 0.78 10.95
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Table 1. (Cont.) Descriptive statistics of opinions on the economic impact of immigration (IMM_IMPACT) by country.
Country Sample size Mean Standard deviation % quite good and very good
Romania (RO) 1825 2.88 0.93 19.78
Italy (IT) 1483 2.85 0.97 24.41
Lithuania (LT) 816 2.84 0.87 20.10
Estonia (EE) 873 2.84 0.79 15.46
Austria (AT) 1150 2.83 0.98 24.43
Russia (RU) 2607 2.82 0.83 15.61
Iran (IR) 1375 2.81 1.17 27.35
Croatia (HR) 1125 2.79 0.79 13.69
Ecuador (EC) 108 2.76 1.19 20.49
Hong Kong (HK) 1962 2.76 0.80 13.71
Serbia (RS) 1748 2.72 0.94 13.73
Cyprus (CY) 778 2.67 0.89 15.30
Slovakia (SK) 870 2.67 0.98 19.43
Bulgaria (BG) 1142 2.67 0.87 10.42
Nicaragua (NI) 1199 2.63 0.94 9.92
Guatemala (GT) 1008 2.59 0.97 8.83
Tunisia (TN) 989 2.58 0.91 12.64
Greece (GR) 1055 2.50 1.00 15.36
Thailand (TH) 1187 2.50 0.88 7.50
Colombia (CO) 1487 2.44 1.07 9.68
Myanmar (MM) 1198 2.44 1.17 20.62
Egypt (EG) 966 2.39 1.00 14.39
Bosnia (BA) 1473 2.37 1.03 10.18
Hungary (HU) 1059 2.36 1.00 10.10
Czech (CZ) 1063 2.25 0.96 7.43
Turkey (TR) 2012 2.14 0.94 7.95
Iraq (IQ) 1009 2.06 1.03 10.21
Whole sample 77433 2.94 1.01 26.91
Source: Authors’ calculations using WVS/EVS (2021).
development represent 26.9%. However, there is a huge
heterogeneity across countries, with values ranging from
7.4% to 69.9%.
For an overview of the data, we plot the average
value of IMM_IMPACT over some selected contextual
variables (Figure 1). The correlation between country
income and the opinion concerning the impact of immi‐
grants on the economy is not at all clear. In particular,
the views inmiddle‐income countries are quite heteroge‐
neous. Most countries of the sample have a small stock
of immigrants and display a huge heterogeneity in their
beliefs concerning IMM_IMPACT, while the data tend to
show that the higher the migrant stock, the higher the
belief that immigration has a positive impact, on average.
The heterogeneity of opinions is striking in countries that
are net receivers of immigration rate, but also salient in
countries that are a source of emigration.
4. Results
4.1. Individual Versus Contextual Variables
In this section, we study the impact of individual and
country characteristics on individual beliefs concerning
the impact of immigration on the development of a per‐
son’s country. Model 1 only includes individual char‐
acteristics. Model 2 includes only contextual variables,
and Model 3 combines both types of determinants. The
results are displayed in Table 2.
Given that immigration may have important effects
on social, cultural, and political life, non‐economic fac‐
tors are found to play an important role in shaping atti‐
tudes towards immigrants.Most of the results ofModel 1
are standard. Like other studies,we find that gender does
not have a significant impact and neither do the number
of children or marital status. As expected, people who
are immigrants themselves, or whose mother or father
immigrated, aremore likely to support immigration. Also,
like other studies, we find that older people evaluate the
impact of immigrationmore negatively. We also discover
that living in a larger town increases support for immigra‐
tion. To the extent that the ratio of immigrants is higher
in big cities, this would support the hypothesis thatmore
contact with immigrant communities increases positive
views about them. Concerning employment status, we
find no evidence that unemployed people would most
fear the competition of immigrants, nor that retired peo‐
ple would be more concerned while students would see
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Figure 1. Correlations between selected contextual variables and average opinions regarding the economic impact of
immigration (IMM_IMPACT) by country. Source: Authors’ calculations using UN (2019a, 2019b), World Bank (2020),
WVS/EVS (2021).
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Table 2. Influence of individual and contextual variables on opinion about immigrants’ impact.
Dependant variable: IMM_IMPACT
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Contextual variables
Log GDP per capita 0.01 (0.07) –0.01 (0.07)
GDP growth 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Unemployment –0.01 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)
Inflation –0.00 (0.01) –0.00 (0.01)
Gini index 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Migrant stock 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Net immigration rate –0.01 (0.02) –0.01 (0.02)
Individual variables
Male 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Age –0.02***(0.00) –0.02***(0.00)
Number of children 0.00 (0.00) –0.00 (0.00)
Marital status
Married Ref. Ref.
Divorced –0.01 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)
Separated 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Widowed –0.01 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)
Single/Never married 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Education
Lower Ref. Ref.
Middle 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Upper 0.09*** (0.01) 0.09***(0.01)
Employment
Full time Ref. Ref.
Part time 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Self employed 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Retired/pensioned –0.01 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)
Housewife –0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Student 0.07***(0.02) 0.07***(0.02)
Unemployed 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Other –0.06**(0.03) –0.06**(0.03)
Household income scale 0.01***(0.00) 0.01***(0.00)
Size of town 0.01***(0.00) 0.01***(0.00)
Religion attendance 0.00***(0.00) 0.00***(0.00)
Immigrant 0.21***(0.02) 0.21***(0.02)
Mother is immigrant 0.06**(0.02) 0.06**(0.02)
Father is immigrant 0.08**(0.02) 0.08**(0.02)
Most people can be trusted 0.19***(0.01) 0.19***(0.01)
Trust people another nation 0.12***(0.01) 0.12***(0.01)
Trust people another religion 0.06***(0.01) 0.06***(0.01)
Constant 2.40***(0.05) 2.71***(0.83) 2.31***(0.80)
𝜎2e 0.840 0.878 0.840
Log‐likelihood –103272.72 –105016.27 –103271.32
VPC 0.1437 0.1441 0.1386
Sample size 77433 77433 77433
Countries 61 61 61
Notes: ** p‐value < 0.05, *** p‐value < 0.01; standard error into brackets. Source: Authors’ calculations using SWIID (Solt, 2020),
UN (2019a, 2019b), World Bank (2020), WVS/EVS (2021).
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immigration more positively than full‐time workers (the
reference group). Our results concerning unemployment
are in line with Cooray et al. (2018), Gorodzeisky and
Semyonov (2018), and Hatton (2016), but Economidou
et al. (2020) andMayda (2006), for instance, find a signif‐
icant negative effect.
To the extent that the age variable is significant, and
retirement is not, consideration about the cohesion of
social norms seems to have more weight than consid‐
erations on fiscal benefits for pension funding. We do
not report results regarding ideology because this would
considerably reduce our sample from 61 countries to
53 countries, but for this reduced sample, we find, as
with other studies, that people placing themselves on
the right of the political spectrum have a more nega‐
tive opinion about the impact of immigration. Individuals
who attend religious services are also more likely to
consider the economic impact of immigration positively.
Finally, all variables concerning trust (most people can be
trusted, trust people from another nation, trust people
of another religion) have positive and significant effects.
As is common in the related literature, we also demon‐
strate that pro‐immigration preferences are positively
and robustly correlated with higher household income
and individuals’ level of human capital. We discuss these
two findings in more detail below.
Model 3, including both individual and contextual
variables, displays similar coefficients for both individ‐
ual and contextual variables to Models 2 and 1, respec‐
tively. Models 2 and 3 reveal that none of the contextual
variables have a significant effect on the opinion stud‐
ied. Indeed, the VPC only decreases slightly compared
to Model 1. Wealth and other macroeconomic indica‐
tors such as growth, unemployment rates or inflation
are not important determinants of individuals’ opinion
about immigration. This indicates that macroeconomic
context does not explain much of the variation between
countries in the attitude studied. The level of inequal‐
ity does not play any role per se either. Of the variables
related to the presence of immigrants in the economy,
migrant stock has a positive effect.
4.2. Effect of Education According to the Context of
the Country
We test whether education affects the view concern‐
ing the economic impact of immigration in a different
way, depending on the context of the country. To this
end, we interact the contextual variable of interest with
the highest educational level attained by the individuals
(Table SM3 in the Supplementary Material and Figure 2).
In most cases, the coefficients of the variable resulting
from multiplying the education level with a contextual
variable are significant, showing that education has a dif‐
ferent influence between countries. These effects are illus‐
trated through several graphs in Figure 2,which shows the
marginal effects of each level of education on the opinion
studied, for realistic values of each contextual variable.
The results are in line with the hypothesis derived
from the Heckscher‐Ohlin model, according to which
wages of skilled people in capital‐abundant countries
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Figure 2. Predictive margins of educational level on opinion about immigrants’ impact, depending on the context of the
country of residence. Source: Authors’ calculations based on models 4A‐4D using SWIID (Solt, 2020), UN (2019a, 2019b),
World Bank (2020), WVS/EVS (2021).
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immigrants are less skilled than natives) than in poor
countries. Accordingly, more‐educated people in coun‐
tries with higher GDP per capita tend to consider the
impact of immigrants on the economy more positively
than educated people in countries with less income per
capita. The graph illustrates clearly that the opposite
occurs for people with medium or low levels of edu‐
cation, who assess the economic role of immigrants in
poorer countries more positively than in rich countries.
Since the interactions with migration stock and net
immigration rate (only for the highest education level)
are positive, the support of educated people also proves
to be higher in countries that receive more immigrants.
This confirms the hypothesis that the effect of education
is not only driven by expected personal income but also
by other processes enhanced by education. As demon‐
strated by the graph plotting the predictive margins
according to the stock of migrants, this enhancing effect
also exists for the other education levels, as suggested
by the intergroup contact theory, but it is more salient
for the highest category. The graph for net immigration
rate shows the opposite phenomenon. The net entry of
immigrants does not influence the judgements made by
more‐educated people but does decrease the support of
other categories of individuals. Our results echo those
for the UK from Kaufmann (2017), who highlights a dif‐
ferent impact of education levels and changes in eth‐
nic diversity.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that there is a huge disparity
in countries with lower levels of inequality between the
most educated and the rest, while the marginal effect is
almost similar for all categories in highly unequal coun‐
tries. Remarkably, the support of educated people is
almost the same regardless of the inequality level. Again,
the opinions of educated people prove to be less influ‐
enced by economic concerns than other categories of
people. The support of people with a lower education
level is considerably less than that of educated people
in countries with low levels of inequalities and hence
countries performing high redistribution. These results
do not fit with the hypothesis that individuals with
a high education level believe that immigration could
translate into higher income tax levels (tax adjustment
hypothesis). Conversely, our results could be compatible
with a system in which public balance is guaranteed by
adjusting benefits, meaning that people would compete
with immigrants for welfare benefits. Our results are at
odds with O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006), who find a pos‐
itive interaction between skills and inequality. However,
these authors do not include the variable inequality itself,
which raises some doubts about the interpretation of
the coefficient of the interaction. Additionally, the dif‐
ference may be driven by their sample, which comprises
mainly high‐ andmiddle‐income countries. O’Rourke and
Sinnott (2006) consider that their results are compati‐
ble with a trade model where technologies are different
between countries and where inequality is a proxy for
skill premium.
4.3. Effect of Income According to the Context of
the Country
Turning to the influence of personal income depending
on the context of the country, we perform a similar exer‐
cise as before (Table SM4 in the Supplementary Material
and Figure 3 below). In all cases, the interacted variable
is significant. However, considering realistic values of the
variables, Figure 3 shows that behaviours appear similar
across individuals of different income levels in different
countries, regardless of the wealth of the country and
inequality level.
Regarding the influence of the stock of migrants on
individuals with different income, the differences are not
salient either. If at all, the opinions of the poorest are less
positive towards immigration, regardless of the stock of
migrants, and the opinions of people living in countries
with few migrants are less positive than the opinions
of people living in countries with a high proportion of
migrants. People with higher income are more aware of
the positive impact of immigration and this is more overt
where the stock ofmigrants is higher. All else being equal,
people’s opinion is more positive regarding immigrants
in countries where the net immigration rate is negative,
but household income does not matter.
4.4. Effect of Education for People Inside Versus Outside
the Labour Force
We perform several robustness checks. First, we conjec‐
ture that if the effect of education is mainly driven by
labour market channels, then the effect of education
should be different for people who are employed or
self‐employed, compared to non‐working people (unem‐
ployed, retired, students, housewives, etc.). Figure 4 illus‐
trates the predicted effect of each education level accord‐
ing toGDPper capita (interaction betweenGDPper capita
and education levels). To conserve space, we do not
report all the coefficients (available upon request). Coeffi‐
cients of individual and contextual variables are very simi‐
lar for both subsamples, and similar to those obtained for
Model 3 (Table 2) and 4A (Table SM3 in the Supplement‐
aryMaterial) for the whole sample. O’Rourke and Sinnott
(2006) perform a similar exercise for a sample of 24
middle‐ and high‐income countries but their results differ
sharply from ours. Gender and age are only relevant for
people outside the labour force while the results regard‐
ing skills aremaintained for the sample in the labour force
and not for the outside sample. In the study by O’Rourke
and Sinnott (2006), the findings concerning the effect of
skills seem to reflect only the functioning of labour mar‐
kets. In contrast, our results, based on a much more het‐
erogeneous sample andmore recent data, require amore
nuanced conclusion. Indeed, the graphs for people inside
and outside the labour market are quite similar, thus con‐
firming that labourmarket considerationsmay not be the
main driver of individuals’ assessment of the impact of
immigrants on economic development.
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Figure 3. Predictivemargins of income level on opinion about immigrants’ impact, depending on the context of the country
of residence. Source: Authors’ calculations based on models 5A‐5D using SWIID (Solt, 2020), UN (2019a, 2019b), World

















Log of GDP per capita (out labor market)
Figure 4. Predictive margins of education on the opinion about immigrants’ impact, for individuals inside and outside
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4.5. Effect of Education in High‐ Versus Middle‐Income
Countries
We also explore the possibility that patterns con‐
cerning the interplay between education and national
income may differ according to country development
level. To this end, we split the sample into three
income groups according to the World Bank classifi‐
cation: lower‐middle, upper‐middle, and high‐income
countries, which account, respectively, for 13, 22, and
26 countries. The results are presented in Table SM5 (in
the Supplementary Material) and Figure 5.
The patterns are similar for lower and higher middle‐
income countries but differ from the behaviour observed
in high‐income countries. In middle‐income countries,
the richer the country, themore people report more neg‐
ative judgements about immigrants’ contribution to eco‐
nomic development. The opposite occurs in rich coun‐
tries where the richer the country the more people
express more positive assessments. The marginal effect
of education on these opinions, and its interaction with
the country’s level of development, is only significant for
high‐income countries. All in all, our results demonstrate
that education only has an influence on opinion in rich
countries and is higher the richer the country. Therefore,
special attention should be paid to middle‐income coun‐
tries with positive net immigration rates (see table SM1
in the Supplementary Material). In countries such as
Brazil, Russia, and Turkey, opinion regarding migrants is
not influenced by macroeconomic contexts, and there
is no difference between the low‐ and high‐educated
about how this context affects their decision. Opinion
towards migrants in these countries is thus based more
on social identity concerns, values, and beliefs, which are,
by nature, more subjective.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
We estimate a multilevel model to disentangle the
effects of individual‐level characteristics andmacro‐level
variables on individual attitudes towards the economic
impact of immigration, for a wide sample of middle‐
and high‐income countries. We conclude that micro‐
level variables (such as age, being a student or from
an immigrant’s family, trust, income, and education)
explain most of the variation between countries in
the assessment of the economic impact of immigrants.
Furthermore, our results show that opinions are not
directly based on “objective” measures of wellbeing,
inequality levels,migrant stock, and net immigration rate.
Finally, our study emphasizes that education is a more
important differentiating characteristic for studying atti‐
tude towards immigrants than personal income.
Our study does not validate the group‐threat hypoth‐
esis. If at all, our results lend more support to the inter‐
grouphypothesis, sincewe find that, the higher the share
of migrants in the country, the more education increases
positive views about immigrants. Obviously, we cannot
be sure that a higher share of migrants in a country
leads to greater contactwith immigrants for respondents.
Indeed, a higher share of immigrants may reflect his‐
torical and cultural ties with immigrants’ countries of
Lower-middle income countries
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Figure 5. Predictive margins of education level on the opinion about immigrants’ impact, for different levels of country
income. Source: Authors’ calculations based on Model 4A by sub‐samples using World Bank (2020) and WVS/EVS (2021).
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origin, a more permissive policy towards immigration in
the past, or a historical tradition of integration and toler‐
ance of diversity that may also foster positive attitudes
towards immigration. Nevertheless, if the current entry
of immigrants is high, people with lower education levels
have a less positive view.
We find weak support for the welfare‐state channel.
Indeed, opinions of the richest and the poorest seem
homogeneous across countries even if they provide very
different welfare services. Older people judge the effect
of immigration on development more negatively even
if they are still working, while being retired has no sig‐
nificant effect. Therefore, the feelings of older people
regarding immigration would seem to be guided more
by their worries about preserving existing social norms.
Additionally, the support of educated people (and the
richest) for immigration is almost the same, regardless
of the inequality level. However, the support of people
with lower education levels is considerably lower inmore
equal countries than in unequal countries.
Our results are in line with the hypothesis derived
from trade models, according to which the wages of
skilled people in capital‐abundant countries would be
less impacted by immigration than in labour‐abundant
countries, while the opposite occurs for peoplewhohave
attained a lower level of education. However, educa‐
tion (and other individual characteristics) proves to have
the same impact on the opinion of individuals regard‐
less of their employment status. Therefore, our findings
are compatible with the labour‐market hypothesis but
also highlight the fact that personal economic interest is
not the main determinant of natives’ assessment, even
when we include low‐ and middle‐income countries in
the sample. We thus extend the results of the literature
that highlights the limited role of self‐interest in attitude
formation―mostly based on studies for North America
andWestern Europe―to a broader context. Immigration‐
related attitudes are mostly driven by perceptions of the
impact of immigration on the nation, which are not accu‐
rately captured by “objective”measures such as the ones
included in this study.
All in all, our results give more support to socio‐
psychological approaches to immigration attitudes such
as subjective appreciation of the consequences of immi‐
gration moderated by education rather than to political‐
economy approaches to immigration attitudes. Formal
education therefore appears to be an effective tool for
creating conditions for the better integration of new‐
comers. This study also highlights that individuals with
a lower level of formal education are also more scepti‐
cal when immigration increases or are more concerned
about preserving redistribution. Thus, a sine qua non for
integration policies to succeed is to devote more effort
to addressing the worries of less‐educated people. This
is especially challenging nowadays since the way people
build their knowledge is changing considerably, due to
the mass of information received through new technolo‐
gies. Policymakers must therefore rethink strategies to
increase social trust and consider how to communicate
these strategies to deal with the social and political con‐
sequences of large inflows of immigrants.
Obviously, our data does not allow us to address
important concerns such as ethnic or racial considera‐
tions, as suggested by the group‐threat theory, or to test
the positive and negative mechanisms that may emerge
from intergroup contacts. However, cross‐sectional stud‐
ies such as ours naturally complement more detailed
studies. This study draws attention to the overlooked
case of middle‐income countries registering positive net
immigration rates, such as Brazil, Russia, and Turkey.
There, opinion towards immigrants is not explained by
education level or macroeconomic context. This is a wor‐
risome situation that presages significant conflicts in the
future. More work is needed to understand attitudes
towards immigrants in emergent countries to enhance
the basis of social cohesion in the future.
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